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2 **The Scientific Research Output of U.S. Research**
3 **Universities, 1980–2010: Continuing Dispersion,**
4 **Increasing Concentration, or Stable Inequality?**

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8 **Abstract** Extending and expanding Geiger and Feller's (1995) analysis of
9 increasing dispersion in R&D expenditures during the 1980s, the paper analyzes
10 publication and citation counts as well as R&D expenditures for 194 top producers
11 using Web of Science data. We find high and stable levels of inequality in the 1990s
12 and 2000s, combined with robust growth both in the system and on individual
13 campuses, considerable opportunities for short-range mobility and very limited
14 opportunities for long-range mobility. Initial investments in research, private control,
15 and the capacity of wealthy institutions to attract productive faculty are
16 associated with high levels of scientific output. New entrants to the system and those
17 that leave the system are both clustered near the bottom of the hierarchy.

18 **Keywords** Higher education · Research productivity · Institutional stratification ·
19 Institutional mobility

20

21 **Introduction**

22 This paper analyzes growth, inequality, and mobility in the population of top U.S.
23 research universities during the period 1980–2010. The paper focuses on the
24 question of whether scientific output continued to disperse across U.S. research
25 universities in the years after 1990, as researchers found it had in the 1980s, or
26 whether, alternatively, output became more concentrated in the hands of a smaller
27 number of leading universities. A third possibility, also considered here, is that
28 relations established in the system in the 1980s remained generally stable through
29 the end of the period. The analysis is important because of its implications for

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30 science policy. Some policymakers and university leaders have expressed concern
 31 that continued dispersion dilutes the quality of research produced by the leading
 32 institutions. Others have expressed concern that increasing concentration is
 33 restricting the capacity of the system as a whole to generate important new ideas
 34 and findings.

35 We will argue that neither of these two concerns captures the key features of the
 36 development of the U.S. system of academic science. To evaluate the significance of
 37 patterns of dispersion or concentration, it is necessary to examine changes in
 38 inequality in relation to other features of the system, namely, growth and mobility.
 39 Whether either increasing concentration or stable inequality should be considered
 40 problems depends, in large measure, on whether the system is growing and how
 41 much mobility exists in the system. Concentration may be tolerable or even
 42 beneficial if the system as a whole, as well as the great majority of individual
 43 campuses, are increasing in output. Similarly, high levels of concentration may be
 44 acceptable to the extent that opportunities for mobility also exist in the system.

45 *Growth, Inequality, and Mobility*

46 Thus, to understand how scientific research output in U.S. research universities has
 47 developed in recent decades, it is necessary to distinguish (1) *system (and individual*
 48 *campus) output*, (2) *trends in dispersion and concentration*, and (3) *mobility*
 49 *opportunities*.

50 (1) *System output* can be defined as the total output of all institutions using
 51 measures such as R&D expenditures, publications, and citations (and potentially
 52 other outputs such as patents and licenses). Individual campus outputs can be
 53 defined in the same way. Individual institutions in the system may or may not
 54 contribute steadily to system growth. Moreover, growth may be consistent with
 55 either increasingly equal, increasingly unequal, or stable distributions of expendi-
 56 tures and outputs among institutions in the system, and it may be consistent with
 57 high or low levels of mobility. (2) *Dispersion/concentration* can be defined as the
 58 change in levels of inequality over time using measures such as the Gini coefficient
 59 and interquartile shifts in shares of production. (3) *Mobility* can be defined as the
 60 extent of opportunities for changing rank within the system using measures such as
 61 the proportion of institutions experiencing inter-decile movement over time. In
 62 highly stratified systems the great majority of institutions maintain their relative
 63 positions, with minor fluctuations in rank, and few institutions experience long-
 64 range upward or downward mobility. In less stratified systems, the opposite is true.

65 Our analysis shows a system marked by greatly increased system- and campus-
 66 level output *and* stably high levels of inequality, with considerable short-range but
 67 very limited long-range mobility opportunities for individual institutions. The
 68 stable and high levels of inequality we find clearly have not restricted either system
 69 or individual campus level output. It seems more likely that they have been a spur to
 70 it, given the competition institutions experience to move up the ranks and the
 71 opportunities that have existed for short-range mobility.

72 *Extending Geiger and Feller's Analysis*

73 The paper is designed as an extension and expansion of an article published in 1995 by
 74 the higher education scholars Roger L. Geiger and Irwin Feller (hereafter G&F). G&F
 75 documented the dispersion of research and development expenditures beginning in the
 76 1960s, as part of a national policy to create larger numbers of research universities.
 77 During the decade of the 1980s, they found a declining share of total R&D spending by
 78 top quartile universities, with most of the gain going to second quartile institutions.
 79 Bottom quartile institutions also gained share. G&F attributed their findings to the
 80 likelihood that “distinguished universities operate near a production frontier defined
 81 by a maximally feasible percentage of faculty already conducting funded research and
 82 by physical constraints on the expansion of research facilities” (p. 347). By contrast,
 83 they argued, second-tier universities shared many of the characteristics of the leading
 84 universities, such as moderate teaching loads, up-to-date laboratories, and first-rate
 85 research in some fields and were thus in a position to capitalize on the expansion of
 86 resources available to support research.

87 G&F's work provided an alternative perspective to a series of reports of the
 88 period expressing the fear that too many universities competing for research funds
 89 would threaten “a slow erosion of the average quality of the nation's scientific
 90 effort” (Rosenzweig 1992: 18) (see also House of Representatives 1992; OTA
 91 1991). G&F argued instead that continued dispersion principally benefited
 92 institutions of above average quality, and generally caused continued improvement
 93 in them, thereby adding to the nation's scientific prowess.

94 G&F focused solely on R&D expenditures. We examine two additional
 95 indicators of scientific productivity that were not available at the time G&F
 96 published their work: publications and citations.¹ Although the capacity to generate
 97 R&D expenditures is correlated with outcomes, it is the outcomes themselves that
 98 provide measures of research impact (see, e.g., Charlton and Andras 2007).
 99 Research volume, or publication count, is an indicator of the steadiness of the
 100 institution's research output and is one measure of its capacity for influence.
 101 Citations are used as major criteria in international measures of an institution's
 102 scientific eminence, such as the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) rankings of
 103 world universities (Charlton and Andras 2007; see also Pouris 2007). Although it is
 104 true that some lightly cited articles have an outsized influence on major
 105 developments in science, as Adams and Griliches (1998) observe, “They [citations]
 106 are the best measure that we have” for analyzing scientific impact (p. 2).

107 G&F identified institutional characteristics they considered likely to be
 108 associated with scientific productivity, but did not investigate the influence of
 109 these characteristics empirically. We conduct such an empirical examination. We
 110 examine the institutional factors associated with higher levels of output in each of
 111 the three measures of productivity we investigate. We focus on initial and
 112 continuing investments in research, financial and human resources capacity to

IFL01 ¹ While they represent an outcome of increasing interest to students of scientific research (see, e.g.,
 IFL02 Owen-Smith 2003), patents and licenses are produced at a fractional rate as compared to publications and
 IFL03 citations. We do not include them in this paper.

113 conduct research, and other institutional advantages (notably, private control and
114 operation of a medical school) that may affect the success of the research enterprise.

115 We focus on the same set of institutions identified by G&F as the top research
116 institutions at the beginning of their study period. This strategy allows us to examine
117 changes within a fixed population, the standard approach to longitudinal analysis. At
118 the same time, we recognize that the system of research universities can also change
119 through the entrance of new universities and the exit of those that no longer produce
120 enough science for research to be considered a central mission. We characterize new
121 entrants and, using 2010 data, show that both those institutions that have more
122 recently entered the system and those from the G&F sample that have exited it tend
123 to cluster near the bottom of the research university hierarchy, resulting in little
124 change in the overall shape or levels of inequality, but adding to the mobility
125 opportunities in the system.

126 Previous Literature

127 Academic science is highly stratified both internationally and within the United States.
128 The top eight countries produced nearly 85% of the top 1% cited papers between 1993
129 and 2001, and the next nine produced 13% of these papers, indicating a “stark
130 disparity” between the first and second strata of countries in scientific impact, as well
131 as between these countries and the remaining countries in the world (King 2004).
132 Within the United States, a similar pattern exists: Our calculations indicate that the 108
133 Carnegie “very high research” universities—fewer than 5% of the more than 2,500
134 4-year colleges and universities in the United States—produced some three-quarters
135 of the papers catalogued in the Web of Science (WoS) in 2010 from high-quality peer-
136 reviewed journals. The 99 Carnegie “high research” universities at the next level
137 produced another 15% of WoS papers in 2010 (authors’ calculations).

138 In the mid-1990s, theorists debated whether the scientific community could
139 expect a still more stratified system of research production in the future or one in
140 which scientific output expanded and dispersed across institutions. Among those
141 who expected increasing stratification, Ziman (1994) argued that powerful forces of
142 concentration based on excellence are “endogenous to science” and would lead to
143 greater concentration over time. Merton’s (1968) theory of “accumulative
144 advantage” provided one justification for expecting higher levels of concentration
145 among elite research universities. The much higher salaries of professors at these
146 universities and their capacity to attract talented graduate students and postdoctoral
147 scholars were among the forces Ziman identified as supporting greater concentra-
148 tion. Economists added complementary emphases based on the average and
149 marginal costs of scientific production. Adams and Griliches (1998) argued, for
150 example, that the leading universities, because of stronger human and technical
151 infrastructure, have lower costs of performing research than less prestigious
152 universities and therefore have a comparative advantage in generating high quality,
153 important, and highly cited research.

154 By contrast, other theorists focused on the influence of entrepreneurialism and
155 mimetic pressures as bases to justify their expectations for continued dispersion in

156 an expanding scientific field. Gibbons et al. (1994) anticipated that the post-World
157 War II expansion of research and educational systems, coupled with the “inexorable
158 logic of entrepreneurial fund-raising,” would encourage a dispersion of scientific
159 research output as well as its reconfiguration into larger and more productive
160 interdisciplinary groups. Halfman and Leydesdorff (2010) argued that senior
161 administrators’ tendency to imitate the leaders in their field—what others have
162 called the pressures of institutional isomorphism—would produce a “global
163 conformation of performance standards” among institutions competing with one
164 another for eminence, and consequently greater equality in output among these
165 competing institutions. Governments sought to augment these mimetic pressures,
166 beginning in the 1980s, through the introduction of performance-based funding and
167 ranking systems (Hicks 2012).

168 A third position is also evident in the debate. Hicks and Katz (2011) argued that
169 political and social pressures for the more equitable distribution of funding
170 opportunities could lead to greater dispersion of access to resources for research,
171 while the unequal distribution of talent and infrastructure would nevertheless result
172 in a continued, and perhaps increasing, concentration of highly-cited articles
173 produced by top-tier universities.

174 The empirical evidence bearing on these rival predictions has been mixed. Some
175 field-level studies support proponents of the increasing concentration thesis.
176 McNamee and Willis (1994) found variation in levels of concentration across four
177 fields studied between 1960 and 1995, but, after periods of dispersion, institutional
178 representation in leading journals generally reverted to “an inner circle of
179 prestigious academic institutions.” Adams and Griliches (1998) examined eight
180 fields and found a correlation between citations and lagged R&D expenditures. They
181 concluded that the larger research programs in the leading universities produced
182 research that was more frequently cited and, by implication, of higher quality. In
183 addition, private universities generated more research output per additional dollar of
184 R&D than public universities. Adams et al. (2005) pointed to another infrastructure
185 advantage in the growing size of scientific teams. Studying publications over the
186 period 1981–1999, they found that team sizes had increased by 50% over the period.
187 The increase in team size was most evident at the most prestigious universities,
188 allowing for increases in “scientific output and influence” at these institutions.
189 Others found that the surge in patenting and licensing that occurred following the
190 passage of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 had a net positive effect on publications and
191 citations, creating a new advantage for entrepreneurial universities, most of which
192 were clustered among top research producers (Owen-Smith 2003).

193 Other studies supported the dispersion thesis. At the international level, it is clear
194 that dispersion has been the dominant trend. Studies of scientific output from the
195 1990s through the mid-2000s document the declining share of worldwide scientific
196 output held by the United States and the growing representation of European
197 countries, such as England and Germany, and East Asian countries, such as China
198 and Japan, in the world share of papers and citations (Javitz 2006; King 2004).
199 Halfman and Leydesdorff (2010) showed similar findings for the top decile of
200 world universities, which slowly but steadily lost ground in the 1990s and 2000s.
201 Moreover, the Gini coefficient for the 100 most prominent world universities



202 dropped during the period 1990–2007 (ibid.). As world universities shifted toward
 203 production valued in world rankings, oligopolistic tendencies declined rather than
 204 increased. Evidence from individual countries is less clear. In countries like
 205 Australia in which universities continue to be relatively undifferentiated by quality,
 206 scientific productivity became more dispersed over time (Ville et al. 2006). But
 207 evidence from other countries that have attempted to stimulate competition through
 208 performance-based funding and ranking has as yet not been reported in the literature
 209 at the institutional level.

210 Overview of the Analyses

211 We pursue the analysis in four steps. (1) We begin by discussing the growth of scientific
 212 research output—as measured by R&D expenditures, publication counts, and citations.
 213 The degree of expansion of the system as a whole is an essential contextual feature of
 214 the current structure of scientific research in the United States. (2) Using the Gini
 215 coefficient as our measure of inequality, we then examine the extent to which research
 216 output became more or less concentrated between 1980 and 2010. The Gini coefficient
 217 provides a standard measure of concentration and dispersion in a population. Following
 218 G&F, we also discuss changes in share by quartiles as a second perspective on
 219 inequality. (3) We then turn our attention to mobility, examining inter-decile
 220 mobility patterns. This analysis allows us to identify in a highly textured way how much
 221 long- and short-term mobility has existed in the system over the 30-year period. (4)
 222 Finally, we conduct regression analyses on publications and citations to identify the
 223 covariates associated with scientific research productivity during the period.

224 Data and Methods

225 Sample

226 G&F examined the top 194 research universities in terms of R&D spending using
 227 1980s data from the NSF *Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at*
 228 *Universities and Colleges/Higher Education Research and Development Survey*,
 229 made available by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics
 230 (NCSES). To conduct a longitudinal analysis, we retained their sample. We were
 231 forced to drop six of the institutions, either because they merged with other
 232 institutions or, in one case, because we could not identify the institution in IPEDS,
 233 leaving a sample of 188.² Another 12 institutions were missing from the data set we

2FL01 ² The mergers included the Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and Technology into Oregon Health
 2FL02 and Science University (OHSU) in 2001; the Medical College of Pennsylvania into MCP Hahnemann
 2FL03 Medical College in 1993; MCP Hahnemann University with Drexel University College of Medicine in
 2FL04 2002; Hahnemann Medical School with Drexel University College of Medicine in 2003. The University
 2FL05 of Maryland Baltimore Professional Schools publish as part of the University of Maryland, Baltimore.
 2FL06 Finally, we were unable to ascertain the identity of the institution called Polytechnic University in G&F's
 2FL07 study.

234 used to code institutional characteristics, and were thus not included in our
235 regression analyses.³ These 12 institutions are included in all other analyses.

236 *Dependent Variables*

237 As in G&F, our measurement of total R&D expenditures included all sources of
238 research funding: federal, state and local, industry, foundations and other non-
239 profits, and institutional self-funding. Total R&D expenditures are expressed in
240 2010 dollars.

241 The most widely used source for publications and citations data is the Web of
242 Science (WoS) compiled by Thomson Reuters (see, e.g., Javitz 2006; National
243 Science Board 2014; Toutkoushian et al. 2003). Thomson Reuters indexes journals
244 to the WoS based on specific criteria in an effort to include only high-quality, high-
245 impact academic work. WoS currently features more than 12,000 high-impact
246 journals across disciplines, as well as citation count information.⁴ WoS counts
247 relatively few books and conference proceedings, a limitation of this source.
248 However, papers are the primary vehicle of publication in the sciences and the focus
249 of WoS on the more prestigious journals also seems appropriate for purposes of
250 measuring scientific output that meets minimum quality standards.⁵

251 We measured research volume simply as the count of publications per institution
252 in WoS for each target year, beginning in 1980 and proceeding at 5-year intervals.
253 We counted the institutional affiliations of all co-authors of publications that
254 included more than one author equally. This counting convention is labeled as
255 “whole count” data and compares to “fractional counts,” in which each co-author is
256 credited with a proportional fraction of credit (e.g., in the case of four co-authors,
257 one-quarter credit). In an era in which the number of co-authors is increasing in
258 many fields, whole count data provides much larger publication (and citation)
259 counts for institutions than fractional count data. We used whole counts because one
260 of the reasons for the impressive growth in U.S. scientific output is the greater
261 capacity of university researchers to leverage the talents of co-authors. We
262 concluded that this is a real contribution of new modes of scientific production and
263 should be fully credited as such.⁶

3FL01 ³ These 12 institutions included the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the University of
3FL02 Massachusetts at Amherst, Missouri University of Science and Technology, New Mexico State
3FL03 University, the University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, the University of Texas
3FL04 Medical Branch at Galveston, the University of Texas at Dallas, and the University of Texas M.D.
3FL05 Anderson Cancer Center, the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, the University of
3FL06 Texas Health Science Center at Houston, the University of Puerto Rico Mayaguez, and the Uniformed
3FL07 Services University of the Health Sciences.

4FL01 ⁴ Although the number of journals catalogued in WoS has grown over time, it is possible that researchers
4FL02 at lower-ranked institutions may find their research niches in more applied fields that are not included in
4FL03 WoS data.

5FL01 ⁵ WoS is somewhat less useful for those social science disciplines, such as sociology and political
5FL02 science, in which book publication is important. It is least useful for the humanities in which book
5FL03 publishing is central to the establishment of authors' and institutions' reputations.

6FL01 ⁶ Researchers who use fractional counting find that the number of papers per researcher is rising at a
6FL02 much lower rate. See, e.g., Fanelli (2010).



264 We measured citation count as the number of times a publication catalogued in
 265 the WoS cited an article produced by a target institution during a target year,
 266 beginning in 1980 and proceeding at 5-year intervals. We began by taking all
 267 publications from 1980 and tracing citation counts on these publications through
 268 2016, or 36 years in all. We then took the publications for each institution for 1985
 269 and traced their citation counts through 2016, or 31 years in all. We continued this
 270 procedure through 2010.

271 Growth in citation counts is a function of the number of publications catalogued,
 272 the growth of scientific infrastructure, and the growth of scientific networks over
 273 time, and we can therefore expect that papers published more recently will, in
 274 general, tend to accumulate more citations than those published earlier in the period.
 275 However, there is an exception to this rule: Publications originating prior to 2010
 276 have had a longer period of time to accumulate citations than those originating in
 277 2010. Publications from 2010 have had only 6 years to accumulate citations, and
 278 publications typically take at least two to 3 years to begin to accumulate citations at
 279 a high rate. We have therefore dropped 2010 from the citations regression analysis
 280 as it offers immature data, and would give readers the false sense that citations are
 281 decreasing when every other indicator suggests the opposite (see Fig. 3). Data from
 282 2010 are included in all other analyses.

283 *Growth and Inequality Measures*

284 We used percentage changes across decades and across the entire 30-year period to
 285 describe the expansion of scientific research in terms of institutional share on all
 286 three measures of scientific contribution (R&D expenditures, publications, and
 287 citations). We examine institutions as a whole rather than output per capita.⁷

288 We used the Gini coefficient to describe changes in levels of inequality in the
 289 system. Gini is a widely-used indicator of inequality in resource distribution and one
 290 that is applicable to inputs and outputs of scientific research productivity where
 291 institutions are the unit of analysis (see, e.g., Halfman and Leydesdorff 2010). The
 292 Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality based on the proportions of units along
 293 the Lorenz curve, where 0 represents complete equality in distribution of the
 294 resource, with equal shares controlled by every unit, and 1 represents complete
 295 inequality in distribution, with the resource controlled by one unit only. The lower
 296 the Gini, the more equality; the higher the Gini the less equality. Comparisons of
 297 Gini by decade provide a sense of the extent to which research dispersed across
 298 institutions or became more concentrated.

7FL01 ⁷ We consider the output of the institution as a whole to be a better measure than per capita output
 7FL02 because one advantage of larger institutions is precisely that they produce in a wide variety of areas. This
 7FL03 increases their visibility and prominence. Per capita growth and mobility tables provide a slightly
 7FL04 different picture of the trajectory of the system as a whole and of individual institutions. Medical and
 7FL05 engineering institutions fare somewhat better in per capita analyses, for example. A few small campuses,
 7FL06 such as Rockefeller University, are highly productive on a per capita basis but the small size of their
 7FL07 faculty has led to declining rank in output measures over time. The results of per capita analyses do in
 7FL08 other respects tend to closely mirror those of the whole institution analyses that we use in the paper. Per
 7FL09 capita results are available on request.

299 For a second perspective on inequality, we also categorized institutions by the
 300 R&D quartile in which they were located at the beginning of the period and
 301 examined changes in quartile share over time. This analysis allowed us to
 302 investigate the extent to which the second quartile captured a larger share of
 303 research input and output over time, and therefore to follow up on a notable finding
 304 by G&F for R&D expenditures during the 1980s.

305 *Inter-Decile Mobility Measures*

306 Examination of inter-decile mobility allows for a highly textured treatment of
 307 stratification within the system. We composed deciles of 19 institutions each, except
 308 for the bottom decile which was composed of 17 institutions. We examined changes
 309 in decile composition over three decades: 1980–1990, 1990–2000, and 2000–2010.
 310 We measured inter-decile mobility as movement from a location anywhere in one
 311 decile to a location anywhere in another decile.⁸ For each dependent variable, we
 312 counted the number of institutions that remained in each decile from decade to
 313 decade, and the number of gainers and losers in each decile, as measured by inter-
 314 decile mobility. We measure short-range mobility as the number and proportion of
 315 institutions that moved into the next higher or lower decile during the period. We
 316 measure long-run mobility as the number and proportion of institutions that moved
 317 up or down *more than one decile* over the 30-year period.

318 *Independent Variables in the Regression Analysis*

319 To investigate the sources of high campus levels of scientific output, we sought to
 320 identify institutional characteristics related to initial and continuing investments in
 321 research, financial and human capacity to engage in research, and other institutional
 322 factors plausibly linked to research productivity.

323 *R&D quartile* at the beginning of the period is a dummy-coded variable reflecting
 324 quartiles based on the G&F selection and ranking with respect to total R&D
 325 spending. This variable is a measure of initial investments in research. It allows us
 326 to investigate the effects of original ranking, as well as the extent to which top
 327 quartile institutions have gained more over time relative to lower-ranked
 328 institutions. We also coded *institutional R&D* from NCSSES (NSF 2015). It is a
 329 primary indicator of continuing institutional commitments to fostering a robust
 330 research environment. A wide variety of allocations are included in this variable,
 331 including internal grants, scientific infrastructure spending, and internally-funded
 332 course remissions.⁹

8FL01 ⁸ Inter-decile mobility can be measured in more than one way. An alternative measure, for example,
 8FL02 would be to count any movement of 19 or more places as inter-decile mobility. Such a measure fails,
 8FL03 however, to capture the concept of inter-decile movement accurately in our view, because the concept
 8FL04 signifies location in one decile at time 1 and location in another decile during a later period. The exact
 8FL05 location within the decile is immaterial.

9FL01 ⁹ Although we expected high levels of collinearity between institutional R&D and R&D quartile at the
 9FL02 beginning of the period, in fact the correlation between the two variables ($r = 0.30$) was not too high to
 9FL03 preclude the use of both. No variable in this study has a VIF of over 2.5.



333 The capacity measures focus on financial strength and available human
 334 resources. G&F recommended use of instructional expenditures as a measure of
 335 institutional financial strength. However, this variable proved to be collinear with
 336 several others in our model. We consequently substituted *student subsidy*, as
 337 suggested by Winston (1999, 2004). Student subsidy is a measure of the education
 338 and related expenses not covered by tuition. It is a measure of the discretionary
 339 funds that the institution chooses to dedicate to education and related expenses from
 340 state subsidies and endowments. As an independent variable it does not pose the
 341 same problems of collinearity as instructional expenditures. We obtained data on
 342 student subsidy from the Delta Cost Study data set (AIR 2014).¹⁰ We also obtained
 343 data on number of *full-time faculty* from the Delta Cost Study data set (AIR 2014).
 344 This variable includes full-time, non-tenure track faculty, as well as those who are
 345 tenured or on the tenure track. Counts of tenured and tenure-track faculty were not
 346 collected consistently across institutions during the period of this study, and use of
 347 full-time faculty is a common proxy (Dundar and Lewis 1998). In addition, we
 348 created an interaction between *student subsidy* and *full-time faculty* in order to
 349 explore potential differences in faculty productivity based on the wealth of
 350 institutions.

351 Two other institutional characteristics are often associated in the literature with
 352 higher levels of scientific research output: private control and operation of a medical
 353 school. Private research universities in the United States dominate status rankings
 354 (USNWR 2015) and pay significantly higher salaries than public universities
 355 (AAUP 2015). They are consequently in a position to attract and retain the most
 356 productive faculty members. All else equal, it would seem likely that they would
 357 obtain more resources for producing research and to produce more research output
 358 as well. We coded *control* as public or private, non-profit governance using the
 359 Delta Cost Study database. Medical research holds a distinctive position in
 360 American research universities. In part because of generous funding from the
 361 National Institutes of Health and foundations such as the Howard Hughes Medical
 362 Institutes and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, differences in publication rates
 363 for fields in or closely related to biomedicine are significantly higher than rates in
 364 other fields (Times Higher Education 2011). By a large measure, medical schools
 365 are also the most popular recipient of funding from individual and family
 366 foundations. We included two factor variables, *has a medical school*, coded 0 for no
 367 medical school at the institution, 1 for the presence of a medical school, and *is a*
 368 *medical school*, coded 1 for institutions that are themselves free-standing medical
 369 schools or health science institutions and 0 for all other institutions.

370 We also included two control variables. We included *panel year* to control for
 371 expansionary trends over the period. We coded academic year in 5-year panels.
 372 Finally, it is necessary to control for the few multi-campus universities that report
 373 system-wide data, which may lead to over-counts of the contributions of the main
 374 campus (see Jaquette and Parra 2016). We included a dummy variable (labeled
 375 *system reporting*) for campuses that report data to IPEDS in this fashion.

10FL01 ¹⁰ Because student subsidy is mathematically derived, there were 16 cases of negative subsidy which we
 10FL02 converted to 0 as no subsidy was offered at those institutions in those years.

376 The [Appendix](#) provides descriptive statistics on the independent and dependent
 377 variables used in these analyses. As shown in the [Appendix](#), several of the
 378 independent variables are strongly left skewed. We therefore logged all continuous
 379 variables to normalize their distributions. In addition, there were three missing
 380 values for student subsidy, one missing value for full-time faculty, and one missing
 381 value for institutional R&D. In each case, we interpolated values from data in
 382 previous and succeeding years.

383 *Regression Modeling Strategy*

384 We gathered data over 20 years (1990–2010) in 5-year increments for 188
 385 institutions of G&F's original sample of top performing institutions in terms of
 386 R&D spending. The regression therefore reflects trends for the G&F population of
 387 institutions only and is consequently not generalizable to the population of higher
 388 education institutions across the U.S. Observations drawn for the same group of
 389 cases over time produces panel data, where universities are observed multiple times.
 390 Panel data such as these make ordinary least squares regression inappropriate
 391 because observations of the same university over time are not independent. One
 392 standard analytical process is to employ a fixed effects model (FEM), which
 393 removes unobserved time invariant characteristics of universities by analyzing only
 394 the variation within universities over time (Halaby 2004). A key drawback to the
 395 FEM is that it cannot produce parameter estimates of time-invariant characteristics
 396 such as some that are central to our study—initial R&D spending level, control, and
 397 presence of a medical school—because they would be eliminated with all of the
 398 between case-variation.

399 The alternative random effects model (REM) addresses the problem of
 400 unmeasured, time-invariant university-specific heterogeneity with a university-
 401 specific error term in addition to the classic error term. If these “random intercepts”
 402 are uncorrelated with the covariates on the right hand side of the regression
 403 equation, the REM has all the unbiased properties of the FEM as well as greater
 404 efficiency. However, Hausman tests suggest that we cannot assume zero correlation
 405 between the random intercepts and our covariates of interest. Thus, to proceed, we
 406 implement a hybrid approach (Allison 2009). The hybrid model simultaneously
 407 estimates parameters on two versions of the time-variant covariates. One version is
 408 the time-invariant university means. The other is a version in which the university-
 409 specific means are subtracted from each of the time-varying covariates. Concep-
 410 tually, this divides the variation in each time-varying covariate into a “within” and a
 411 “between” component. The time-invariant covariates enter the model in their
 412 natural form, and we use the REM to estimate the effects of each (see Allison 2009
 413 for a full discussion). The coefficients on the “within” versions of the time-invariant
 414 covariates will be identical to those produced with the FEM, but the hybrid model
 415 also allows us to produce estimates of the effects of time-invariant covariates and
 416 the “between” university variation in time-varying covariates. Panel data such as
 417 these often yield heteroskedastic and serially correlated error terms and we therefore
 418 implement a variance/covariance matrix that is robust to both (Rogers 1993).

419 We set out our hybrid model as follows:



$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(X_{it} - \bar{X}_i) + \beta_2\bar{X}_i + \beta_3Z_i + u_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

421 where subscript i represents institutions and subscript t represents the time points.
 422 The time-varying independent variables are represented by X_{it} , the mean of the
 423 time-varying variables is \bar{X}_i , and time invariant variables are represented by Z_i . The
 424 unit-specific error term is u_i and the classical error term is ε_{it} . The model
 425 decomposes X_{it} into a within-institution component ($X_{it} - \bar{X}_i$), that is the equivalent
 426 of a fixed effects coefficient, and a between-institution component (\bar{X}_i) which is the
 427 potentially biased. We ran the analysis using Stata 13.1.

428 Results

429 *Output Growth*

430 The period 1980–2010 was one of steady and impressive growth in U.S. scientific
 431 research output as measured by research expenditures, research publications, and
 432 citations (see Figs. 1, 2, 3). Total research expenditures for the institutional sample
 433 grew in 2010 dollars from about \$4.4 billion in 1979 to \$46.9 billion in 2010, a
 434 964% increase. Growth of R&D expenditures was evident in every decile during
 435 each time period measured. Research publications grew from about 191,000 in 1979
 436 to about 555,000 in 2010, a 190 percentage increase over the period, and again
 437 growth was evident in every decile during each time period measured. Citations
 438 grew from 4.3 million in 1979 to 10.7 million in 2005, a 146% increase. Here, too,
 439 increases were evident in every decile during each time period measured.¹¹

440 The great majority of the individual campuses in the sample increased their
 441 output over each decade studied.¹² Only 23 of the 188 sample institutions reporting
 442 data throughout the period (12.2%) experienced declines in any one of the three
 443 decades, and only one of these institutions experienced declines over two decades.
 444 Only eight of the sample institutions (4.3%) experienced declines in constant-dollar

11FL01 ¹¹ Growth should not be equated uncritically with proportionate increases in quality or significance of
 11FL02 research. As universities and government agencies have begun to measure publication and citation
 11FL03 outputs more regularly, pressures have increased to adopt distorting publication tactics, such as cutting up
 11FL04 larger and higher quality papers into small text units, a practice known “salami publishing” or “least
 11FL05 publishable units” (Fanelli 2010), as well as text recycling in multiple publications, also known as “self-
 11FL06 plagiarism” (Necker 2014). On competitive pressures as a source of decline in scholarly reading
 11FL07 practices, see also Abbott (2016). Similarly, it is possible to manipulate citations through “citation rings”
 11FL08 in which inter-connected individuals make tacit agreements to boost each other’s careers through co-
 11FL09 citation. Publications and citations remain the best measures of scientific outputs, but these adaptations to
 11FL10 competitive pressures should be kept in mind as partial explanations for output growth.

12FL01 ¹² We began this analysis in 1979–1980 and examined changes in R&D expenditures and publications in
 12FL02 end years of the following decades 1989–1990, 1999–2000, and 2009–2010. For citations, we examined
 12FL03 changes in 1989–1990 and 1999–2000 only because of foreshortened period for publications from 2010
 12FL04 have had only six years to accumulate citations, as compared to publications published in the earlier
 12FL05 years.




Fig. 1 R&D spending trends




Fig. 2 Publication trends




Fig. 3 Citation trends

445 R&D expenditures in any one of the three decades, and only ten of the institutions
 446 (5.3%) reported declines in citations in either of the two decades we were able to
 447 study in this analysis.¹³

13FL01 ¹³ The gains in publications and citations also reflect the more than threefold growth of journals in the
 13FL02 WoS database between 1972 and 2010 (Larsen and von Ins 2010). The growth in the number of journals
 13FL03 catalogued is itself a function, in part, of a larger and more productive university labor force, capable of
 13FL04 sustaining many more high-quality journals.

Table 1 GINI coefficients for publications and citations by year

	1980	1990	2000	2010
R&D spending	0.52	0.49	0.49	0.48
Publications	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.48
Citations	0.59	0.58	0.56	0.56

448 *Inequality Trends*449 *Changes in the Gini Coefficient*

450 The Gini coefficients for total R&D expenditures, publications, and citations are
 451 reported in Table 1. Decreases in inequality were evident for all three indicators at
 452 the beginning of the period, 1980–1990, consistent with G&F’s findings for total
 453 R&D expenditures. However, the Gini for R&D expenditures and publications
 454 remained constant or very nearly constant thereafter through 2010. (Gini continued
 455 to decline slightly only for citations through 2000). Thus, with the exception of the
 456 slight decline in inequality for citations, dispersion ceased to be the dominant trend
 457 by 1990 in this sample population, and the level of inequality reached in that year
 458 persisted through 2010, marking at least the temporary end to the period of slowly
 459 growing equality in R&D expenditures and research productivity outcomes.

460 Moreover, levels of inequality remained high in absolute terms throughout the
 461 period, particularly for citation counts. We can contrast the Gini coefficients
 462 reported in Table 1 to those common in studies of income distribution in
 463 economically developed countries. Gini coefficients for the distribution of income
 464 within 31 developed countries after taxes and transfers ran between 0.38 and 0.24 in
 465 2010, according to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
 466 (OECD) data (Desilver 2013), much lower than the Gini coefficients for scientific
 467 research output in U.S. research universities.

468 *Changes in Interquartile Shares*

469 As shown in Fig. 1, despite strong absolute gains throughout the period, first
 470 quartile R&D institutions showed a declining proportion of R&D spending over
 471 time with the other three quartiles showing very slight gains in share. By contrast,
 472 first-quartile shares of publications and citations remained steady (see Figs. 2, 3).
 473 Thus, G&F’s emphasis on the growing prominence of second quartile institutions
 474 requires amendment for later periods; what we see over time is a steady increase in
 475 funds available for R&D on all levels, and very slight gains in share for institutions
 476 in the second through fourth quartiles in initial rank. The impressive system-wide
 477 gains in publications and citations, however, had virtually no effect on interquartile
 478 shares in terms of institutions.

479 *Inter-Decile Mobility*

480 We found somewhat more mobility for R&D expenditures than for either
 481 publications or citations, but nevertheless more than 70% of the top decile
 482 institutions in R&D expenditures remained stable throughout the study period. For
 483 publication and citation counts, stability was pronounced in the top two deciles, with
 484 more than 80% of the membership of the top two deciles remaining constant from
 485 decade to decade. Stability was also evident in the bottom decile with more than
 486 70% of the membership at the bottom remaining constant from decade to decade.

487 In R&D expenditures, publications, and citations, the top two deciles were
 488 composed of nearly equal numbers of private and public institutions. Among the
 489 privates, Harvard University, Stanford University, the Massachusetts Institute of
 490 Technology, Yale University, Cornell University, the University of Pennsylvania,
 491 Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University, Washington University-St. Louis,
 492 and Northwestern University were consistently ranked in the top two deciles across
 493 each of the measures and all three decades. Among the publics, five University of
 494 California campuses (UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC San Diego, UC San Francisco, and
 495 UC Davis), and six "Big Ten" campuses (the University of Wisconsin, the
 496 University of Michigan, the University of Minnesota, the University of Illinois,
 497 Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University) were consistently ranked in
 498 the top two deciles across each of the measures and all three decades, together with
 499 two other flagship state universities (the University of Washington-Seattle and the
 500 University of Colorado-Boulder). A few other privates (the University of Southern
 501 California, California Institute of Technology, the University of Chicago), and
 502 several other publics (the University of Pittsburgh, the University of North Carolina-
 503 Chapel Hill, the University of Texas-Austin, Rutgers University, and the University
 504 of Florida) very nearly reached this level of high and consistent ranking in the top
 505 two deciles.¹⁴

506 We found more short-range mobility in the middle of the stratification structure,
 507 and again mobility was more common in R&D expenditures than in publications or
 508 citations. We examined 30 decile-decade categories (i.e., ten deciles times three
 509 decades). For R&D expenditures, we found that more than half of the members
 510 changed deciles from one decade to the next in 17 of the 30 categories. By contrast,
 511 for publications, we found that more than half of the members changed deciles from
 512 decade to decade in just eight of the 30 categories, and, for citations, more than half
 513 of the members changed deciles from decade to decade in just seven of the 30
 514 categories. Clearly, considerable short-range mobility exists in the broad mid-ranks

14FL01 ¹⁴ We found a similar level of stability at the bottom of the hierarchy; approximately 20 universities
 14FL02 consistently scored low across each of the measures and all four decades. These included several regional
 14FL03 campuses (the University of South Alabama, the University of North Dakota-Grand Forks, the University
 14FL04 of Alabama-Huntsville, and the University of North Texas), two California campuses more often thought
 14FL05 of as teaching institutions (San Diego State University and San Jose State University), three former liberal
 14FL06 arts colleges (the College of William and Mary, Ohio University, and Old Dominion), several struggling
 14FL07 science and engineering oriented universities (the Missouri University of Science and Technology, the
 14FL08 Tennessee Technological University, the State University of New York College of Environmental
 14FL09 Science, and the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology), and two minority-serving institutions
 14FL10 (Florida A&M and the University of Puerto Rico).



515 of the U.S. system of research universities, but even short-range mobility is limited
516 in the cases of publications and citations.

517 Only a small number of institutions rose or fell by *more than one decile* over the
518 30-year period, the measure we have used for long-range mobility, and again we
519 found fewer of these highly mobile institutions in the publications and citation count
520 data than in R&D expenditures data. In R&D expenditures, slightly more than 20%
521 of the sample moved up or down more than one decile over the 30-year period. In
522 the publications rankings, 14% changed rank by more than one decile, and this level
523 of mobility in the citation count ranks was still more restricted: only 12% of the total
524 changed ranks by more than one decile over the period.

525 Ambitious research institutions are interested only in upward mobility, and it is
526 consequently notable that only 8% of institutions experienced upward mobility of
527 more than one decile during the 30-year period in publication count rankings, and
528 only 7% experienced this level of upward mobility in R&D spending or citation
529 count rankings. These findings indicate that long-range upward mobility was not a
530 prominent feature of the system of scientific production in American research
531 universities during the study period.¹⁵

532 *Regression Analysis*

533 Initial and continuing institutional investments in R&D were strongly associated
534 with publication and citation counts. As shown in Table 2, R&D quartile rank at the
535 beginning of the period was a very important predictor of both publication and
536 citation counts, net of covariates. In addition, the analysis reveals a cleavage
537 between high R&D spending institutions and more modest spenders. First and
538 second quartile R&D institutions produced significantly more research and citations
539 throughout the period than the reference group, fourth quartile institutions, and the
540 point estimates for third quartile institutions were insignificant.

541 Results for financial strength showed mixed results. Expressed as an independent
542 variable, it is negative and shows significant association only with citations, net of
543 covariates. Full-time faculty fits a similar pattern, negative and significant only for
544 citations. The interaction term *student subsidy x full-time faculty*, however, is

15 5FL01 Upwardly-mobile campuses included Emory University (5th to 2nd decile in publications and
5FL02 citations), Arizona State University (5th to 3rd decile in publications; 6th to 4th decile in citations), the
5FL03 Georgia Institute of Technology (7th to 4th decile in publications and citations), and the University of
5FL04 South Florida (7th to 5th decile in publications and citations). In addition, the mobility opportunities of
5FL05 free-standing medical colleges were high during the study period in which the budgets of the National
5FL06 Institutes of Health were consistently three to five times larger than that of the National Science
5FL07 Foundation (AAAS 2016). Several of them, such as the University of Texas M.D. Anderson School of
5FL08 Medicine (6th to 3rd decile in publications; 5th to 2nd decile in citations), the Baylor College of Medicine
5FL09 (4th to 2nd decile in publications; 5th to 3rd decile in citations), and the Icahn School of Medicine at Mt.
5FL10 Sinai Hospital (4th to 3rd decile in citations) were among those experiencing inter-decile upward mobility
5FL11 during the period. By contrast, the University of Oregon (4th to 8th decile in publications; 3rd to 7th
5FL12 decile in citations), Temple University (4th to 6th decile in publications and citations), Rockefeller
5FL13 University (6th to 8th decile in publications; 2nd to 5th decile in citations), Brandeis University (7th to
5FL14 9th decile in publications; 5th to 8th decile in citations), and Howard University (8th to 10th decile in
5FL15 publications and citations) were among the institutions experiencing notable downward mobility during
5FL16 the period at the institutional level.

Table 2 Regression

	Publications ^{b,c}	Citations ^{a,b,c}
Quartile 1 Institutions (1979) ^d	0.89** (0.28)	1.14** (0.41)
Quartile 2 Institutions (1979) ^d	0.52** (0.19)	0.67* (0.29)
Quartile 3 Institutions (1979) ^d	0.11 (0.20)	0.21 (0.30)
Student subsidy ^b	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.06)
Full-time faculty ^c	-0.23 (0.13)	-0.45 (0.15)
Student subsidy × Full-time faculty	0.01* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Institutional RD ^{b,d}	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Private, Nonprofit ^c	0.47*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.12)
Has a medical school ^c	0.14 (0.09)	0.20 (0.13)
Is a medical school ^c	0.00 (0.29)	0.03 (0.47)
Panel year	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
System reporting ^c	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.28* (0.11)
Intercept	-86.32*** (4.97)	90.50*** (9.46)
R-Squared within	0.46	0.24
N	870	696

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

^a Citations model includes years 1990–2005

^b Logged in preparation for the regressions

^c Thomson Reuters Web of Science

^d National Science Foundation Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges/Higher Education Research and Development Survey, made available by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES)

^e Delta Cost Project, The American Institutes for Research

545 positive and significant for both publications and citations, meaning that as
 546 institutions gain in financial means, faculty tend to produce more publications and
 547 citations. Continuing investments are represented by institutional R&D expendi-
 548 tures. This variable was not significant in our model either for publications or
 549 citation counts.

550 Net of covariates, the coefficient for private institutions showed a strong
 551 significant association for both publications and citations. Institutions with
 552 medical schools and free-standing medical schools were both nonsignificant. The
 553 latter findings are surprising, given that frequency data showed that free-standing
 554 medical schools (and health sciences universities) were among the most upwardly
 555 mobile institutions during the period. However, the regressions suggest that the
 556 variation associated with medical schools can be explained by other variables in
 557 the model.¹⁶

558 One of the control variables, academic year, showed strong net positive
 559 associations with publication and citation counts. This finding testifies to the steady
 560 upward growth of scientific productivity in the great majority of the institutions over
 561 time, as reflected also in Figs. 1, 2 and 3. Net of covariates, system reporting was
 562 negative and significant, indicating that system reporting did not inflate the output of
 563 main campuses reporting as a part of their state systems.

564 *System Change Due to Entrances and Exits*

565 Our study is limited by its focus on a stable set of institutions identified by G&F as
 566 the leading research institutions in 1979. While this is necessary for a longitudinal
 567 study of the type we have conducted, a more comprehensive treatment of growth,
 568 inequality, and mobility in academic science would need to take into account the
 569 fact that membership in the research system has a dynamic quality resulting from
 570 the entrance of new institutions into the system and the departure of institutions
 571 that no longer produce enough research to count as among the top research
 572 universities.

573 We began to explore the consequences for the system produced by exits and
 574 entrances by comparing the current top 200 research universities, as measured by
 575 R&D expenditures, to the G&F identified population from 1979. We found 25 new
 576 entrants to the top 200 and 19 from the G&F sample that were no longer in the top
 577 200 in 2010. Both more recent entrants into the top 200 R&D list and those that no
 578 longer engage in enough R&D spending to be classified in the top 200 were
 579 clustered at the bottom of the academic science hierarchy. The vast majority of
 580 recent entrants on the 2010 list (i.e., those not included by G&F) were located in
 581 the bottom three deciles, and only four of the institutions were located in the mid-
 582 range of deciles. Gini coefficients also indicated that levels of inequality were as
 583 high or higher for the current top 200 as they were in the constant sample. Ginis
 584 for R&D expenditures were the same for the two sets (0.48). We found somewhat
 585 more inequality on publication counts for the 2010 top 200 set than for the
 586 constant set of institutions drawn from G&F's sample (0.58 as compared to 0.48),
 587 and marginally higher inequality as well on citation counts (0.59 as compared to
 588 0.56).

16FL01 ¹⁶ Unreported between coefficients were significant; however, it is unclear whether this is due to
 16FL02 diversity of institutional contexts, or whether it is due to omitted variable bias.

589 **Discussion**

590 Our analyses reveal an increasingly productive system of U.S. research universities,
 591 with very robust growth rates throughout the period on all three measures examined.
 592 Moreover, the great majority of the 188 individual institutions in our longitudinal
 593 sample also increased their research output steadily throughout the period. These
 594 robust growth patterns co-existed with a stable and high level of inequality, as
 595 measured by Gini coefficients and inter-quartile shares. The dispersion of research
 596 spending observed by G&F in the 1980s leveled off after 1990, as did dispersion in
 597 publications and citations. Considerable short-range mobility existed in the system,
 598 but mobility of more than one decile over the 30-year period was rare. Competition
 599 for place may have contributed to the overall productivity of the system, even if it
 600 failed to produce many universities whose positions improved or deteriorated
 601 greatly over time.¹⁷

602 Our findings do not support either the model of increasing concentration or the
 603 model of continuing dispersion of research contributions. We find some support in
 604 the data for G&F's finding of a declining first quartile and rising second quartile of
 605 research institutions. However, these trends are most prominent in the 1980s (the
 606 period of G&F's analysis), mixed through the 1990s, and reversed in the 2000s so
 607 that first quartile institutions begin to gain relative share again (see Figs. 1, 2, 3).
 608 The findings on Gini coefficients are consistent with this pattern (see Table 1).

609 Our findings suggest a mature, highly unequal system with considerable
 610 opportunity for short-range upward mobility in the broad middle ranks but very
 611 limited opportunity for long-range mobility. Highly cited research continues to be
 612 concentrated in a set of approximately 30 institutions that were also among the most
 613 productive institutions in 1979. Only a few institutions have joined the top stratum
 614 since 1979. More flux is evident below this top stratum. Moreover, new entrants
 615 largely replace exiting institutions at the bottom of the hierarchy. These findings
 616 suggest that university administrators who promote short-term mobility targets or
 617 invest heavily in novel strategies for moving up in the publication or citation
 618 rankings are likely to be disappointed.

619 The top institutions have the resources and prestige to recruit top scientists and
 620 scholars.¹⁸ This recruitment power should lead to increasing concentration. An
 621 offsetting factor may be the high-quality of new doctorates produced by the
 622 country's leading graduate programs. Because opportunities are, by definition,
 623 limited at the top, a large proportion of high-quality individuals may begin and
 624 continue their careers at lower-ranked institutions, where they have sufficient
 625 resources to pursue productive careers. We emphasize that our data do not bear
 626 directly on these questions, and future research will be necessary to explore these
 627 and other reasons for the impressive levels of stable inequality we found.

17FL01 ¹⁷ A case can be made that continued dispersion would have encouraged a still more productive system,
 17FL02 but the obvious counterfactuals to prove such a case are missing. Dispersion leveled off after 1990, but
 17FL03 the rate of system productivity, as measured by publications and citations, nevertheless continued to grow
 17FL04 robustly.

18FL01 ¹⁸ For a penetrating analysis of these processes in one discipline, see Burris (2004).

628 The study provides support for the Hicks and Katz (2011) hypothesis that R&D
 629 expenditures are more equally distributed than measures of scientific output, such as
 630 publications and citations, would predict. It remains to be seen whether this
 631 disjuncture is due, as Hicks and Katz argue, primarily to politically driven
 632 preferences among funders for a broader distribution of resources, or to other
 633 factors, such as differential levels of commitment among institutions to
 634 entrepreneurial activities that bypass peer review. In either event, the disjuncture
 635 between inputs and outputs injects somewhat more opportunity into the system than
 636 we could expect from a resource environment in which funding was more
 637 completely aligned with patterns of demonstrated scientific contribution, as
 638 represented by WoS publications and citations.

639 Within the system, initial investments in research were positively and signifi-
 640 cantly associated with higher levels of research contribution, as measured by
 641 publications and citations. In addition, faculty were shown to be more productive
 642 during the period in wealthier institutions where resources supporting their
 643 scholarship are more likely to be available. The patient, far-sighted application of
 644 resources toward accomplishment of the research mission is a necessary and
 645 perhaps obvious influence on scientific research productivity, but one that few
 646 institutions have had the latitude or determination to enact rigorously. Institutions
 647 that have had such practices in place longer tend to be in a better position to support
 648 faculty scientific productivity at the highest levels, as demonstrated by the
 649 significant interaction between institutional wealth and faculty productivity in both
 650 models. Nor do all universities have the historical engagement or ongoing financial
 651 resources to invest heavily in the research enterprise, including through renewal of
 652 laboratory facilities and equipment, on-campus research support services, and the
 653 maintenance of established pro-research practices, such as the use of post-doctoral
 654 scholars, lower teaching loads for research-productive scholars, and the availability
 655 of course remissions. Our analyses indicate that private research universities are
 656 more committed to such investments, independent of their initial position at the
 657 beginning of the time period.

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 659 the statistical modeling used in this paper. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for
 660 comments that improved the quality of the paper.

661 **Appendix**

Descriptive statistics

Variable	N. Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Skewness
Dependent variables						
Publications ^b	870	2,150	2,303	0	25,656	3.06
Citations ^b	870	61,514	83,233	0	918,119	4.08
Indep. variables						
R&D quartiles (1979) ^c	870	2.50	1.12	1.00	3.00	0.00
Full-time faculty ^d	870	1,456	1,161	23	11,585	2.53
Institutional R&D ^{a,c}	870	29,800,000	34,600,000	0	274,000,000	2.11
Student subsidy ^{a,d}	870	152,000,000	222,000,000	0	2,830,000,000	5.05
Private ^d	870	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.79
Medical school ^d	870	0.68	0.64	0.00	2.00	0.41
Academic year	870	2000	7	1990	2010	0
System reporting ^d	870	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00	1.17

^a Logged in preparation for the regressions

^b Thomson Reuters Web of Science

^c National Science Foundation Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges/Higher Education Research and Development Survey, made available by the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES)

^d Delta Cost Project, The American Institutes for Research

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